A cover-free family is a well-studied combinatorial structure that has many applications in computer science and cryptography. In this paper, we propose a new public key traitor tracing scheme based on cover-free families. The new traitor tracing scheme is similar to the BonehFranklin scheme except that in the Boneh-Franklin scheme, decryption keys are derived from Reed-Solomon codes while in our case they are derived from a cover-free family. This results in much simpler and faster tracing algorithms for single-key pirate decoders, compared to the tracing algorithms of Boneh-Franklin scheme that use Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Our tracing algorithms never accuse innocent users and identify all traitors with overwhelming probability.
Introduction
In a public key traitor tracing scheme, the encryption key is made public and everyone can use this public key to encrypt messages and broadcast the resulting ciphertexts to all users. Each user is given a unique secret key which can be used to decrypt the broadcasted ciphertexts. Malicious users may combine their decoder keys to construct a pirate decoder that can decrypt the broadcast. A pirate decoder contains a secret key different from all of the colluders' secret keys, or a different decryption algorithm. Pirate decoders can be sold to unauthorised users allowing them to illegally access the content. A tracing algorithm takes a pirate decoder and outputs one of the colluders. Typical applications of such systems are distribution of content in pay-per-view television and web-based content distribution.
Traitor tracing was first introduced by Chor, Fiat and Naor [4] . The first public key traitor tracing scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [2] . In their scheme, two models of pirate decoders are considered. The first model is the single-key pirate model and assumes that there are two separate parties called the key-builder and the box-builder. The key-builder is a group of malicious users who combine their secret keys to create a new pirate decryption key. The pirate key is then handed over to the box-builder who implements the decryption box freely based on this single pirate key. The single-key pirate model is thus a simple but a realistic model of the pirate market. The second pirate model is more sophisticated and allows a pirate decoder with more than one pirate key. In Kiayias and Yung's model [15, 16] , a pirate decoder may also have several built-in self protection functionalities, for example, remembering previous tracer queries, erasing internal keys and shutting down when it "detects" that it is being queried by a tracer. "Crafty pirates" require more advanced tracing algorithms.
A common technique in tracing general pirate decoders is the black box confirmation technique which has been used in many schemes including [2, 26, 35, 22, 6, 19, 20] . Even though, this technique achieves the goal of tracing sophisticated pirate decoders, however, it is obviously not an efficient technique. If c denotes the maximum number of malicious users who have created a pirate decoder, a traitor tracing algorithm using the back box confirmation technique should implement a sub-procedure that takes a subset of c users and determines whether the subset contains the whole set of traitors or not. Thus, for a scheme of n users, up to n c executions of the sub-procedure may be required. While there has not been any known efficient tracing algorithm for the crafty pirate model, it may be argued that this pirate model is not very realistic as a self protection mechanism in a crafty pirate decoder usually requires the embedding of several keys [36, 37] . It remains as an open problem to design a public key traitor tracing with efficient tracing algorithm against crafty pirates.
In this paper, we only deal with single-key pirates. We propose a new public key traitor tracing scheme with an efficient combinatorial traitor tracing algorithm against single-key pirate decoders based on cover-free families. At present, Boneh-Franklin's tracing algorithm [2] is the most efficient algorithm for tracing single-key pirates. This is an algebraic algorithm which uses BerlekampWelch [1] decoding algorithm for generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Two other traitor tracing schemes [26, 18] also use Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Our traitor tracing scheme is similar to the Boneh-Franklin scheme except that in the Boneh-Franklin scheme, decryption keys are derived from Reed-Solomon codes, but in our scheme, decryption keys are derived from a cover-free family, resulting in simpler and faster tracing algorithms compared to the tracing algorithms of Boneh-Franklin scheme.
Cover-free families (CFF) are well-studied combinatorial structures with many applications in computer science and cryptography such as information retrieval, data communication, magnetic memories, group testing, key distribution and authentication [14, 32, 31] . It is interesting to discover yet another application of cover-free families for traitor tracing. A c-CFF(m,n) is a pair (S, B) where S is a set of m points and B is a collection of n subsets (or blocks) of S with the property that the union of any c blocks cannot cover another block. A cover-free family can be constructed with large n and relatively small m. In our scheme, there are n users that are used to label the n blocks, and m modular linear equations that are used to label the m points. Secret keys of the n users are generated as vector solutions of a certain number of modular equations based on the incidence matrix of the cover-free family. Our tracing algorithms identify traitors by taking intersection of certain subsets derived from the cover-free family and so are simpler and faster than Boneh-Franklin tracing algorithms. The drawback is that our tracing algorithms may not identify all traitors, although we show that they will identify all traitors with an overwhelming probability. In addition, our algorithms are error-free, meaning that an innocent user is never wrongly accused by the algorithms.
Our method of generating secret keys using a number of modular linear equations is inspired by the work of Narayanan et al. [27] , although in [27] the set of equations satisfied by a certain secret key is chosen randomly, whereas in our scheme the equations are deterministically determined using the incidence matrix of the cover-free family. In [27] , an innocent user may be mistakenly identified as a traitor. In our scheme however, due to the cover-free property, the traitor tracing algorithms will never accuse innocent users. We also note that Narayanan et al's scheme is not a public key scheme. Finally, flaws in the key generation algorithm of Narayanan et al's scheme are reported in [34] .
Organization of the paper. Section 2 introduces cover-free families. Section 3 briefly presents our intuition behind the scheme. Section 4 describes our new traitor tracing scheme; and the tracing algorithms are presented separately in Section 5. We conclude our paper in Section 6.
Cover-Free Families
Cover-free families were first introduced in 1964 by Kautz and Singleton [14] to investigate superimposed binary codes. Since then, these combinatorial structures have been studied extensively and appeared to have many applications in information theory, combinatorics and cryptography including information retrieval, data communication, magnetic memories, group testing, key distribution and authentication [14, 3, 12, 24, 29, 32, 31] .
Definition 1 A c-cover-free family is a pair (S, B), where S is a set of m elements and B is a collection of n subsets (called blocks) of B with the following property: for any 1 ≤ c ≤ c, the union of any c blocks cannot contain any other block. We use the notation c-CFF(m, n) to denote a c-cover-free family (S, B) with |S| = m and |B| = n.
For the ease of presentation, through out this paper, we assume S = {1, 2, . . . , m}. The following theorem gives a lower bound for the parameter m in term of parameters c and n. See [11, 13, 30] for different proofs of this theorem.
Theorem 1 For a c-CFF(m, n), it holds that m ≥ θ c 2 log c log n for some constant θ.
The constant θ in Theorem 1 is shown to be approximately 1/2 in [11] , approximately 1/4 in [13] and approximately 1/8 in [30] . Slightly stronger bounds are given in [33] . A simple construction of cover-free families is based on concatenated codes [7, 8, 9, 10] .
For our traitor tracing scheme construction, we want to choose a c-cover-free family with large n and small m since as we will see later, the parameter c becomes the collusion threshold, the parameter n becomes the number of users, and traitor tracing complexity depends on the parameter m.
Suppose we have a c-CFF(m, n) (S, B) with S = {1, 2, . . . , m} and B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }. We construct its incidence matrix M as follows. The matrix has n rows and m columns. Label n rows by n blocks of B and label m columns by m elements of the set S. The entry M[i, j] at row labeled by B i and column j is 1 if j ∈ B i and is 0 if j ∈ B i . The c-cover-free property is interpreted in the incidence matrix as follows. For any c blocks B i 1 , B i 2 , . . . , B i c , where 1 ≤ c ≤ c, and any other block B k , since
. . , and j ∈ B i c . It means that if we take arbitrary c rows i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c and any other row k, then there exists at least a column j such that 
Idea
Suppose we want to construct a public key traitor tracing scheme with n users and c is the collusion threshold. Then we need to use a c-CFF(m, n) (S, B) with an n×m complementary incidence matrix M . We will generate m random modular linear equations:
where parameters t and N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N m will be described in details later. We now label m columns of M by these m equations E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E m , and label n rows of M by n user keys
User i decryption key has the form v i = (v i,1 , v i,2 , . . . , v i,t ) ∈ N t and is generated in such a way that, for each 1
. . , and satisfies equation E m .
We will show that in our new traitor tracing scheme, if c traitors i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c collude then from their keys v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c they can only create pirate key v pirate that has the form
where α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α c are integer numbers such that
Consider the set E of equations that are satisfied by all of the vectors v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c . The linearity implies that the pirate vector v pirate also satisfies all equations in the set E. However, from the property of the matrix M , any innocent user k, there exists at least one equation in the set E that is not satisfied by v k .
Therefore, from a pirate key v pirate , we trace the traitors as follows. First, we identify the set E of equations that are satisfied by v pirate . Next, for each equation in E, take the corresponding set of vectors that satisfy this equation. Finally, find the intersection of these sets. The set of indices of the vectors in this intersection identifies the traitors. From the above analysis, we can see that no vectors corresponding to innocent users can remain in the intersection because, a vector corresponding to an innocent user must fails at least one equation in the set E.
The Proposed Traitor Tracing Scheme
In this section, we present a new public-key traitor tracing scheme based on the idea outlined in the previous section. We show that our proposed scheme is semantically secure against passive adversary assuming the difficulty of the standard DDH problem. The scheme has two tracing algorithms: open-box tracing and black-box tracing which will be presented in the next section.
Key generation
Let n be the number of users, c be the collusion threshold, and λ, ∆ be security parameters.
1. Select a c-CFF(m, n) (S, B) with an n × m complementary incidence matrix M where m = θ c 2 log c log n and θ is a small constant.
2. Choose a group G of ∆-bit order such that it is infeasible to find a multiple of order of G (we can choose G as the group Z * M where M = pq is a RSA modulo). Choose a group element g of high order. Choose 2c + 1 random numbers
3. Set the public encryption key to be P K = (y, g 1 , . . . , g 2c ).
. . , p z } such that each prime is picked at most 2c − 2 times.
5. Generate a random m × (2c − 1) matrix (µ i,j ) such that any 2c − 2 rows of the matrix are linear independent. Consider the following m random modular linear equations
Label m columns of M by m equations and label n rows of M by n vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . Each vector is of the form v i = (v i,1 , v i,2 , . . . , v i,2c−1 ) and is generated in such a way that, for 
and set the secret decryption key of user i to be
Example. Let look at steps 4 and 5 in the following toy example with m = 5 and c = 2.
Step 4: z = 5/2 = 3. Generate 3 random primes
Step 5: Generate 5 random modular linear equations
is generated so that
We first solve for (
and (E 4 ) in modulo p 2 , and solve for (v 1,1 , v 1,2 , v 1,3 ) in (E 5 ) in modulo p 3 , and finally, using Chinese Remainder Theorem to derive the final solution in modulo p 1 p 2 p 3 .
Remark.
1. The public encryption key P K = (y, g 1 , . . . , g 2c ) contains 2c + 1 group elements, so P K is approximately (2c + 1)∆-bit long.
User decryption key dk
log c log n-bit long.
Encryption and Decryption
Encryption. A message M ∈ G is encrypted as
where r is a random number.
Decryption. User i using the secret decryption key dk i to decrypt
The correctness of the decryption algorithm can easily be verified as follows. In the step 6 of the key generation, we have
and g
Security of the Encryption Scheme
We show that our encryption scheme is semantically secure against a passive adversary assuming the difficulty of the decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G.
The decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G is to distinguish between tuples of the form (ν, ν a , ν b , ν ab ) and the form (ν, ν a , ν b , ν c ) where ν is chosen random from G and a, b, c are random number.
With the assumption that the decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G is hard we show that the probability for an adversary to win in the following game is negligible over one half. In this game, the challenger executes the key generation procedure and gives the public encryption key to the adversary. The adversary then produces two messages M 0 and M 1 and gives them to the challenger. The challenger randomly chooses δ ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary a ciphertext of M δ . The adversary then answers δ ∈ {0, 1} and she wins if δ = δ.
Theorem 2
The encryption scheme is semantically secure against a passive adversary assuming the difficulty of the DDH problem.
A proof of the above theorem can be found in the appendix. Similar to the Boneh-Franklin [2] scheme, our scheme can be modified to achieve security against chosen ciphertext attacks using Cramer-Shoup [5] approach.
Traitor Tracing Algorithms
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, we will show that if the traitors do not know a non-zero multiple of the order of the group G and the discrete log problem in G is hard then the only pirate key that the traitors can construct is a convex pirate key. Convex pirate key is a key of the type
where α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α c are integer numbers such that α 1 + α 2 + · · · + α c = 1. Here dk i 1 , dk i 2 , . . . , dk i c are decryption keys of c traitors with 1 ≤ c ≤ c.
In the second part, we present open-box traitor tracing algorithm. That is how to trace traitors given a convex pirate key dk pirate . Finally, black-box traitor tracing algorithm is presented in the third part.
Pirate Keys
In the key generation procedure, the public key is set to P K = (y, g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 2c ) where
A tuple (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e 2c ) ∈ Z 2c is said to be a (discrete log) representation of y with respect to the base g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 2c if y = g
2c , or equivalently, A group of malicious users {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c }, where 1 ≤ c ≤ c, can use their keys dk i 1 , dk i 2 , . . . , dk i c to construct a pirate key as follows. They select random integer numbers α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α c such that α 1 + α 2 + · · · + α c = 1 and calculate
It is clear that each user decryption key dk
It is easy to see that dk pirate is a representation of y with respect to g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 2c so it can be use as a pirate key for decryption.
In this construction of pirate key, we call {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } as active traitors if all the linear coefficients α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α c are non-zero. The purpose of traitor tracing is to identify these active traitors.
There may be some inactive traitors who support the collusion but they did not contribute their keys into the formation of pirate key. It is impossible to trace these inactive traitors. So we only focus on tracing active traitors. For this purpose, we define the following set
In the following lemma, we show that if the active traitors {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } do not know a non-zero multiple of the order of the group G and the discrete log problem in G is hard then the only pirate keys that they can construct are convex pirate keys in the above set Convex(i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c ). A proof of the lemma is given in the appendix. 
Convex(U )
then either the adversary knows a non-zero multiple of |G| or the adversary can effectively compute discrete logs in G.
Open-Box Tracing Algorithm
In open-box tracing, we assume that the tracer can open the pirate decoder and obtain the pirate key dk pirate . Let v pirate be the vector formed by the first 2c − 1 components of dk pirate . Then
where α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α c are non-zero integers whose sum is equal to 1.
Recall that in the key generation algorithm, we generate n vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n and m equations E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E m so that each of the vectors satisfies a number of equations based on the n×m matrix M .
For an equation E, let Vector(E) denote the set of all vectors that satisfy E. The following theorem states that it is likely that these two sets are equal and the probability that Equation( v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c ) is a proper subset of Equation( v pirate ) is negligible.
Theorem 3 It must hold that
Let k be an innocent user (i.e. outside of the set of active traitors i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c ). The special property of the matrix M states that there must exist an equation E j such that E j is satisfied by all of the vectors v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c but E j is not satisfied by v k . It means that there exists E j ∈ Equation( v pirate ) such that E j is not satisfied by v k .
This leads to the following tracing algorithm: first identify the set of all equations, Equation( v pirate ), that are satisfied by v pirate , then find the set V of all vectors among v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n that satisfy all equations in Equation( v pirate ). The index set of the vector set V is then the set of traitors. This set V can be formulated as
Vector(E).
The algorithm
Input: A convex pirate key dk pirate 1. Form v pirate from the first 2c − 1 components of dk pirate ;
2. Go through m equations and identify the set Equation( v pirate ) of all equations that are satisfied by v pirate .
3. Each equation E ∈ Equation( v pirate ) has the associated set Vector(E). Find the intersection V of all these vector sets. 
2. X is a subset of active traitors, i.e. X ⊂ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c };
3. the probability that X contains all active traitors is close to 1, more specifically,
Example
Let look at the following toy example with c = 2, n = 5, m = 6. We use a 2-CFF(6,5) (S, B) with S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and B has 5 blocks B 1 = {1}, B 2 = {2, 4}, B 3 = {3}, B 4 = {4, 5} and B 5 = {6} (Note to readers: generally n is much larger than m, please do not get the wrong impression by this toy example!). 
Based on the matrix M , we have six equations and five vectors are generated for five users. For example, v 1 satisfies E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 but does not satisfy E 1 .
The associated Vector sets for these equations are:
Remark that these Vector sets are independent to the generation of equations and vectors. We can find these sets by either looking at matrix M or M. For example, based on matrix M then Vector(E 1 ) is identified by the entries 1 on the first column, and based on matrix M then Vector(E 1 ) is identified by the entries 0 on the first column. These Vector sets can be easily precomputed based on the c-CFF (S, B).
Now suppose that user 2 and user 3 are active traitors, they construct dk pirate . We will go through the open-box tracing algorithm step by step:
1. Form v pirate from the first three components of dk pirate ; v pirate must be an active convex combination of v 2 and v 3 ;
2. Go through six equations and identify the set of all equations that are satisfied by v pirate .
Since v 2 and v 3 both satisfy E 1 , E 5 , E 6 , v pirate satisfies E 1 , E 5 , E 6 . As stated in Theorem 3,
and it is likely that Equation( v pirate ) = {E 1 , E 5 , E 6 }.
We assume Equation( v pirate ) = {E 1 , E 5 , E 6 };
3. Identify the intersection of Vector sets associated with the equations E 1 , E 5 , E 6 :
4. Output the index set of V : X = {2, 3} -these are active traitors.
Rationale
Firstly, in the step 2 of the above example, one can wonder what would happen if Equation( v pirate ) contains more than {E 1 , E 5 , E 6 }, eventhough Theorem 3 asserts that this scenario only happens with a very small probability. The answer is, if this happens then we only catch a subset of active traitors. Indeed, suppose Equation( v pirate ) = {E 1 , E 3 , E 5 , E 6 } then in step 3,
Thus, the algorithm outputs one active traitor X = {2}, and does not detect the other active traitor. We would like to emphasize here that, in all cases, there will be no innocent users are mistakenly output as traitors.
Secondly, one can question the significance of the usage of the cover-free family. The answer is, if we do not use cover-free families then the algorithm will output innocent users as traitors.
Consider the following example where B has one more blocks B 6 = {2, 3}. Now (S, B) is no longer 2-cover-free because B 6 = {2, 3} is covered by B 2 = {2, 4} and B 3 = {3}. We have one more user, 
The new associated Vector sets are:
If user 2 and user 3 are active traitors and in step 2 of the tracing algorithm we have Equation( v pirate ) = {E 1 , E 5 , E 6 } then in step 3,
The algorithm has mistaken output user 6 as an active traitor.
Comparison with Boneh-Franklin's Scheme
While our encryption scheme is the same as the encryption scheme of Boneh-Franklin [2] , our tracing algorithm is much simpler. Tracing algorithm in Boneh-Franklin's scheme involves solving a linear system of dimension n (the total number of users) and decoding BCH error-correcting codes using Berlekamp's [1] algorithm. Whereas, in our tracing algorithm, it only has two simple steps:
Step 1: Finding the set Equation( v pirate ) of equations that are satisfied by v pirate . There are totally m = θ c 2 log c log n equations. This step involves m number of testings whether the vector v pirate satisfies each equation or not.
Step 2: Finding the intersection V of Vector sets associated with equations in Equation( v pirate ). This is a very simple step because m Vector sets associated with m equations are precomputed.
Let r be a small positive integer (for example r = 2). The intersection step is performed even faster if we precompute and store m r intersection sets
These intersection sets have small cardinalities compared to n. If |Equation( v pirate )| < r then V is an intersection of small number (< r) of sets Vector. If |Equation( v pirate )| ≥ r then V is the intersection of |Equation( v pirate )|/r < m/r number of intersection sets V {i 1 ,i 2 ,...,ir} .
With a much simpler tracing algorithm, our scheme achieves almost the same goals as the BonehFranklin scheme:
Error Free Tracing: There are no innocent users mistakenly output by the tracing algorithm as traitors. Output of the tracing algorithm are active traitors.
Full Tracing: While the tracing algorithm in the Boneh-Franklin scheme always outputs all active traitors, our tracing algorithm outputs all active traitors with probability almost near 1. Our algorithm outputs a proper subset of active traitors with only a negligible probability.
Black-Box Tracing Algorithm
A black-box tracing algorithm for single-key pirate can be developed using Boneh-Franklin's [2] approach. In this approach, we need to choose a underlying group G so that the tracer can efficiently solve the discrete log problem in the group such as those used in [28] . If this is the case, then suppose dk pirate = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v 2c ) is a pirate key, we can find the values v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v 2c as follows. Query the pirate device by invalid ciphertexts of the form C = (Y, g r 1 , . . . , g r 2c ) . The pirate device will respond with the value Y /g r 1 v 1 +...+r 2c v 2c . Hence, we can calculate g r 1 v 1 +...+r 2c v 2c . After 2c queries, the tracer can calculate g v 1 , . . . , g v 2c , and with the above assumption, all the components of the pirate key v 1 , . . . , v 2c can be derived by the tracer. From here, the tracer can identify the set of active traitors as it does in the open-box tracing algorithm.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show yet another application of cover-free families in cryptography. We show how to use a cover-free family to construct a public-key traitor tracing scheme. The encryption system of our proposed traitor tracing scheme is similar to that of Boneh-Franklin [2] scheme, thus it is semantically secure against passive adversary assuming the intractability of the standard DDH problem. Our scheme can easily modified as the Boneh-Franklin's scheme to obtain chosen ciphertext security against active adversary. The main advantage of our scheme over the BonehFranklin is in traitor tracing algorithms. While tracing algorithm in Boneh-Franklin's scheme involves solving a linear system of dimension n (the total number of users) and decoding BCH error-correcting codes using Berlekamp's [1] algorithm, our tracing algorithm only has two simple steps related to O( c 2 log c log n) number of modular linear equations (c is the collusion threshold).
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that there exists an adversary, that given the public encryption key P K = (y, g 1 , . . . , g 2c ), produces two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G. Given the encryption C of M δ , where δ is chosen random in {0, 1}, the adversary can identify δ with non-negligible advantage. We show that we can use such adversary to solve the DDH problem in G.
Indeed, given a tuple (ν, ν u , ν v , ν w ), we will decide if w = uv.
Step 1. Choose 2c random numbers k 1 , . . . , k 2c . Let y = ν, g 1 = (ν u ) k 1 , . . . , g 2c = (ν u ) k 2c .
Step 2. Give P K = (y, g 1 , . . . , g 2c ) to the adversary. The adversary returns two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G.
Step 3. Pick a random δ ∈ {0, 1} and give the adversary the ciphertext
The adversary returns δ ∈ {0, 1}.
Step 4. If δ = δ then output w = uv. Otherwise, output w = uv.
If w = uv then the ciphertext C is an encryption of M δ . If w = uv then the ciphertext is an encryption of M = M δ ν v− w u , which can be considered as a random message. Therefore, a non-negligible success probability for the adversary implies a non-negligible success probability in solving DDH in G.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there exists an adversary that, given the public key P K = (y, g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 2c ) and c private keys dk i 1 , . . . , dk ic , can generate a new representation of y with respect to g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 2c that is not in the set
We prove that we can use such adversary to find a non-zero multiple of |G| or to calculate discrete log in G.
Indeed, given z = g x , we show how to use the adversary either to compute x or derive a multiple of |G|. First, choose random numbers r 1 , . . . , r c , u, v and two random square matrices A = (a i,j ) and B = (b i,j ) of size c such that det(A) = det(B) = 1. Then, solve for s 1 , . . . , s c , r c+1 , . . . , r 2c in the following equations
. . , b i,c ) be the vector formed by joining the ith row of the matrix A and the ith row of the matrix B, then it is easy to check that α i is a representation of y with respect to g 1 , . . . , g 2c . Now, give the public key (y, g 1 , . . . , g 2c ) and c representations α 1 , . . . , α c to the adversary. The adversary will return another representation α = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t 2c ). Since α is not a convex combination of α 1 , . . . , α c , we must have t 1 s 1 +. . .+t c s c = u with overwhelming probability. Since α is a representation, we have x(t 1 s 1 + . . . + t c s c ) + (t 1 r 1 + . . . + t 2c r 2c ) = xu + v (mod |G|). So Indeed, consider the equation E j :
µ j,1 X 1 + µ j,2 X 2 + · · · + µ j,2c−1 X 2c−1 = 0 (mod N j ).
Let µ j = (µ j,1 , µ j,2 , . . . , µ j,2c−1 ), then E j ∈ Equation( v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c ) implies that
Let ξ = µ j · v pirate , then ξ = α 1 ξ 1 + α 2 ξ 2 + · · · + α c ξ c . Since E j ∈ Equation( v pirate ) implies ξ = 0 (mod N j ), we have P r α 1 ,...,α c [E j ∈ Equation( v pirate ), E j ∈ Equation( v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c )]
< P r α 1 ,...,α c [ξ = α 1 ξ 1 + α 2 ξ 2 + · · · + α c ξ c = 0 (mod N j )] = 1 N j < 1 2 λ−1 , where the last inequality is derived from the fact that N j is a λ-bit prime.
Proof of Theorem 4. 1. We prove by contradiction. Suppose k ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } and the output X of the tracing algorithm contains k. Since X is the intersection of all sets Vector(E) where E ∈ Equation( v pirate ), k must be contained in each of the set Vector(E). It means that v k satisfies any equation E in Equation( v pirate ). However, the special property of the matrix M states that there must exist an equation E j such that E j is satisfied by all of the vectors v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v i c but E j is not satisfied by v k . That is, there must exist E j ∈ Equation( v pirate ) such that v k does not satisfy E j -a contradition. Thus, the tracing algorithm never outputs an innocent user.
2. Since for any k ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c }, we have k ∈ X, it must follow that X ⊂ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c }. 
We have

